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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ICHARD JENSEN and 
1QN CHRISTENSEN, d/b/a 
ERNINA SEWING MACHINE CO., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
lAROLD L. BARRICK and 
RED M. POULSON (PAULSON), 
/b/a 
IODERN SEWING MACHINE CO., 
Defendants and Respandents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
No. 10027 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court 
ranting a perpetual stay of execution on a default judg-
lent. The stay of execution was granted on the ground 
~at the indebtedness sued upon had been discharged in 
~ankruptcy. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellants obtained a judgment by default against 
~spondents in the District Court. The court su.bsequently 
;sued its order granting a perpetual stay of execution on 
~e judgment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an order vacating the District Cour 
order of perpetual stay of execution or, alternatively, : 
order remanding the matter for trial on the issue of d1 
chargeability of indebtedness. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
The indebtedness owed by respondents to appellan 
arose out of business dealings between the parties. Appt 
lants were principals and respondents were factors or cor 
mission merchants. The relationship of the parties w, 
established by past conduct but particularly by a "Co 
signment Agreement" ( R. 4). By the terms of the agre 
ment appellants were to deviler to respondents merchandis 
particularly sewing machines, which respondents wou 
undertake to sell. The agreement contained the usu 
standard provisions of a consignment agreement. Title 
the merchandise was to remain in appellants. A portion 
the proceeds of the sales of the merchandise, based up( 
sales price from appellants to respondents, was to vest 
and remain the property of appellants and was to be r 
mitted to appellants. 
In addition to the Consignment Agreement, the parti 
entered into what appellants describe as a "Condition 
Agreement," which was for the purpose of providing app1 
lants additional security for the merchandise turned ov 
to respondents. By the terms of this second agreeme 
respondents pledged and assigned to appellants certa 
dealers' reserve accounts in finance companies and two mot 
vehicles. The agreements contained a general stateme 
that monies and proceeds were to be held in trust. 
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3 
Respondt·nts suffered financial reverses and failed to 
emit funds to appellants for the sale of merchandise. Out 
f these business dealings respondents became indebted to 
ppellants in the sum of about $6,000. In March 1961, 
.ppt·1lants instituted suit against respondents for the in-
lebtedness. On February 8, 1962, respondents filed a bank-
uptcy petition and properly scheduled the indebtedness 
1wing to appellants in the sum of $6,668.83. On July 31, 
.962, default judgment was rendered against respondent. 
lespondent was discharged in bankruptcy on November 20, 
.962. Subsequently, upon respondent's motion, the District 
:omi issued its order granting the perpetual stay of exe-
!tttion on the said default judgment. 
Although appellants' brief contains assertions charging 
·espondent with .. obtaining money by false pretenses," "wil-
:ul and malicious injury to property," "fraud," "embezzle-
nent," "misappropriation," or "defalcation," no such alle-
~ations were made in appellants' Complaint. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR 
BURDEN AND HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT RE-
SPONDENTS' DEBT SHOULD NOT BE DISCHARGED 
IN BANKRUPTCY. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in the case of 
National Finance Company of Provo vs. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 
263, that in determining dischargeability of a judgment, the 
court will look only to the judgment and the record of the 
case upon which it was based. Quoting from the opinion 
of the Utah Supreme Court at page 266 of the Utah 2d 
Report, the considerations supporting this rule are set forth 
as follows: 
"In our judgment it better comports with the 
orderly process of justice to require the plaintiff to 
bear the responsibility of pleading, proving and claim-
ing the full benefit of whatever character of cause of 
action he possesses in the original action and of being 
bound thereby, than to allow another trial upon the 
same cause of action raising issues which could have 
been dealt with in the original action. This rule also 
serves the purpose of the bankruptcy act and at the 
same time leaves the way open to guard against the 
discharge of debts of the character excepted from dis-
charge if the facts so justify." 
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The judgment which appellants claim falls within the 
ext·eption of S£'ction 17 of the Bankruptcy Act relative to 
obtaining property by false pretenses and wilful and mali-
cious injury to property right, was obtained by default and 
default judgment ( R. 15, 16 ). No findings of fact or con-
clusions of law were entered. 
An analysis of the plaintiffs' complaint against the re-
spondents dicloses that paragraphs 1 through 5 allege mat-
ters of agreement, title retention and trust rights between 
appellants and respondents. 
Paragraphs 6 and 7 allege that respondents did not 
keep their agreements, and wrongfully appropriated plain-
tiffs' property to their personal use, and failed to account 
for certain funds and the disposition of two automobiles 
on which respondents had given a second mortgage to 
appellants. There is no allegation in the complaint that 
respondents obtained money or property by false pretenses 
from appellants, or that any of their actions were alleged 
to have been wilful and malicious injuries to appellants' 
property. 
Granting that the failure of respondents to answer the 
complaint of appellants', and the entry of· the respondents' 
default does constitute an admission of the allegations of 
plaintiffs' complaint, a reading of the complaint clearly 
shows that the obligation in question does not come within 
the exception to Section 17 of the Banlcruptcy Act because 
there is no allegation in the complaint that respondents 
obtained property by means of false pretenses practiced 
upon the appellants, nor that any act done by them consti-
tutes a wilful and malicious injury to the property of appel-
lants. There is no allegation or showing in the record that 
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1·espondents intentionally failed to keep their agreement 
with appellants or intentionally diverted any trust funds 
in which appellants had rights. The claims made by ap-
pellants with reference to the chattel mortgages given on 
the automobiles are without merit because such mortgages 
were second to those in favor of a third party, and there is 
no claim in the con1plaint as to what respondents did with 
the vehicles other than to fail to account to appellants for 
them. 
The cases cited by appellants in support of their argu-
ment in Point I as to the wilful and malicious injury to 
their property are not in point because in each case either 
the complaint's alleged wilful and malicious injury to speci-
fic property rights, or the court made specific findings in 
the case that the actions of the defendants were in fact 
wilful and malicious. 
The rule announced by the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah in the Daley case, supra, confine the inquiry in 
this proceeding to the record of the case as sa1ne is presently 
before this court, and does not permit new findings or con-
clusions on the question of malice or wilfulness at the 
appellate court level. For this court to permit otherwise 
would enable creditors whose claims have been listed in 
bankruptcy proceedings to relitigate matters of fraud, wilful 
and malicious injury, and other matters within Section 17 
of the Bankruptcy Act the second time when they had 
once elected to bring suit for the claim without setting up 
such circumstances which may have exempted the claim 
from a discharge in bankruptcy. 
The cases cited by appellants which show that judg-
ments for wilful and malicious injury to property may not 
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be dischargable under the Bankruptcy Act are not disputed 
by respondents. The law in this area is clear. However, 
to take advantage of this exception to the Bankruptcy Act, 
it is encumbent upon the party claiming his judgment to 
be within the exception to make a clear showing in this 
respect. All of the cases cited by appellants on this point 
contain specific findings in the record of the case that the 
injury to property did result from wilful and malicious 
action by the other party. The record in the case before 
this court does not disclose that respondents were guilty 
of such action. Having failed to sustain its burden in this 
respect, this Court should affirm the decision of the lower 
court in this matter. 
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POINT II 
THE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
WITH APPELLANTS WERE NOT ACTING IN A FI-
DUCIARY CAPACITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
THE BANKRUPTCY STATUTE. 
A bankrupt is entitled to have the Banlauptcy Act 
liberally construed in his favor. ]ones v. Gerts ( C.A. lOth, 
1941), 121 F. 2d 782, and In Re Newman (C.A. 6th, 1942), 
126 F. 2d 336. 
Appellants' argument under Point II of their brief is 
that respondents in their relationship to appellants were 
acting in a fiduciary capacity, and consequently, by virtue 
of the exceptions set forth in Section 17 of the Bankruptcy 
Act (11 U.S.C.A. 35), the indebtedness was not discharged. 
The pertinent portions of that section are as follows: 
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt 
from all of his provable debts, , , 0 except such as 
0 0 0 ( 4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, 
misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an 
officer or in any fiduciary capacity; 0 0 0 ." 
It is a well established rule that brokers, factors and 
commission merchants are not acting in a "fiduciary capa-
city" as that term is used in the Bankruptcy Act. Crawford 
v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176; Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 
U. S. 328; Swift & Co. v, Bullard & Son, 3 F. 2d 814; Royal 
Indemnity Co. v. Sherman, 269 P. 2d 123; 9 Am. Jur. 2d 
604, Banlauptcy, Section 802; see also the cases annotated 
in 42 A.L.R. 2d 896. 
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As set forth in the Statement of Facts, and as acknowl-
edged by appellants, respondents were factors, or commis-
sion merchants. The indebtedness arose out of the business 
relationship between the parties. The courts in a long his-
tory interpreting the above provision of the Bankruptcy Act, 
have construed the term "fiduciary capacity" to be one 
created or established by an express or technical trust and 
not one arising from implications from contract. Chapman 
v. Fvrsyth, 2 How. 202. The reason for this construction 
of the rule is sound. If the term was construed to embrace 
every fiduciary capacity, it would be difficult to limit its 
application - it would include all debts arising from agen-
cies in all cases where the law implies an obligation from 
the trust reposed in the debtor. The Supreme Court in 
the Chapman case said: 
"Such a construction would have left but few debts 
on which the law could operate. In almost all the 
commercial transactions of the country, confidence is 
reposed in the punctuality and integrity of the debtor, 
and a violation of these is, in a commercial sense, a 
disregard of a trust. 0 0 0 • 
" o 
0 
o. The act speaks of technical trusts, and not 
those which the law implies from the contract. A 
factor is not, therefore, within the act." 
See also Emery & Kaufman, Ltd. v. H eyl (La. 1954), 80 So. 
2d 95 and Shapiro v. Marzigliano (N.J. 1956), 120 A. 2d 
490. 
In establishing the relationship existing between the 
parties, their business dealings plus all the written agree-
ments must be viewed and considered as a whole. Davis 
v. Aetna Acceptance Co., supra. Although the agreements 
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between the parties contained a statement that certain 
monies or proceeds were to be held in trust, the agreements 
could by no means be considered to constitute express or 
technical trusts. The one was a consignment agreement, 
the other a conditional or security agreement. 
The courts have concluded that a statement in a con-
tract that funds are to be held in trust does not create the 
fiduciary capacity of which the statute speaks. In Upshur 
v. Briscoe, 138 U. S. 365, the United States Supreme Court 
used the following language: 
"The statement in the paper signed by Andrews, 
that Briscoe accepts the 'trust,' the statement in the 
paper signed by Briscoe, that he accepts the 'mandate,' 
and the statement in the paper signed by Annie M. 
Andrews, that she accepts the appointment of Briscoe 
'as her trustee,' does not create a 'trust' in its technical 
sense, or make the debt of Briscoe one created by 
him while acting in a 'fiduciary character.' The rela-
tion created was merely the usual one of contract 
between debtor and creditor. Within the meaning of 
the exception in the bankruptcy act, a debt is not 
created by a person while acting in a 'fiduciary char-
acter,' merely because it is created under circum-
stances in which trust or confidence is reposed in the 
debtor, in the popular sense of those terms." 
In American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Berry (Me. 
1913), 87 Atl. 218, the defendant bankrupt was indebted 
to plaintiff for proceeds of fertilizers shipped to defendant 
for sale as plaintiff's agent. The contract between the 
parties contained the following language: 
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.. 'All proct'eds of sales and goods remaining unsold 
to be our property and you are to have no title or lien 
upon said fertilizers, or their proceeds. It is specially 
agreed that you will hold the same in trust and sepa-
rate for the settlement of our account with you. All 
sales shall be guaranteed by you, and the specific pro-
ceeds of the same are to be sent to us as received by 
you; and, until the proceeds of such sales are receiv~~ 
by us, the same shall be held by you in trust for us. 
The court said: 
"But this in no wise changes or strengthens the 
plaintiff's case. The use of the word 'trust' does not 
alter the relations between the parties so as to create 
such a fiduciary capacity as would escape the bankrupt 
act. That relation was fixed by the nature of the 
transaction itself and grew out of the transaction as 
between principal and agent, or owner and factor. 
0 0 0 , 
In ~lichelin Tire Co. v. Heatn (Tex. 1916), 188 S.W. 
943, defendant bankrupt was sued upon an account based 
on a contract covering a consignment of automobile tires. 
The contract provided that the defendant was to hold the 
proceeds of sale "separate and apart and in trust" for the 
plaintiff. The court held that this did not create the fidu-
ciary capacity so as to exempt the indebtedness from dis-
charge. 
Appellants cite three cases under Point II in their brief. 
Gulp r.:. Robey, 229 S.W. 846, involved a suit by Culp, a 
trustee of a trust company organized as an unincorporated 
association, against Robey, to recover funds misappropriated 
by Robey while he was acting as trustee of the trust com-
pany. It particularly concerns the status of partners and 
stockholders; the case does not involve factors or commis-
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sion merchants. In Bracken v. Milner, 104 Fed. 522, de-
fendant was plaintiff's agent, who was given plaintiff's money 
for purposes of making loans to others and secured by 
mortgages and deeds of trust. The Court held that in re-
spect of the collections made by the defendant independ-
ently of his trusteeship in the deeds of trust, his liability 
was released by his discharge in bankruptcy. The court 
did hold that since defendant had made himself the trustee 
in certain of the deeds of trust, he was as to those instru-
ments a trustee of an express trust and that as to monies 
collected on foreclosure of the deeds of trust he was acting 
in a "fiduciary capacity." The court's opinion includes the 
following significant statement: 
"Judge Brown, in Re Basch (D. C.) 97 Fed. 761, 
has applied the same construction to the term 'fidu-
ciary capacity' under the present bankrupt act, and 
held that a debt due by the bankrupt in the character 
of a commission merchant, arising out of his failure 
to account for the value of goods consigned to him 
for sale on commission, on a contract to return the 
goods or their specific proceeds, is not a debt created 
by the bankrupt's 'fraud, embezzlement, misappropria-
tion, or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capa-
city,' and was therefore released by his discharge in 
bankruptcy." 
In Mathieu v. Goldberg, 156 Fed. 541, the relationship 
of the parties was that of principal and factor, as here. 
However, the court's holding was based on a specific finding 
that the defendant's conduct amounted to fraud and em-
bezzlement. No such allegation is contained in appellants' 
Complaint. (See Point I of this brief. ) 
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Appellants contend on page 11 of their brief that with 
reference to the vehicles respondent was a mortgagor, and 
the failure to account for proceeds received from sale of 
the mortgaged vehicles constituted breach of a fiduciary 
relationship. This argument is expressly denied by the 
United States Supreme Court in the Davis case, supra, which 
considt·red the status of a mortgagor of an automobile who 
had executed a note, chattel mortgage, trust reecipt and 
bill of sale as security for a loan. The Court held that the 
liability for conversion of the automobile did not constitute 
liability arising from fraud or misappropriation of the bank-
rupt while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The Court, speak-
ing through Justice Cardozo said: 
"The substance of the transaction is this, and noth-
ing more, that the mortgagor, a ·debtor, has bound 
himseH by covenant not to sell the mortgaged chattel 
without the mortgagee's approval. The resulting ob-
ligation is not turned into one arising from a trust 
because the parties to one of the documents have 
chosen to speak of it as a trust." 
In the same general area the cases hold that a bailee 
is not acting in a "fiduciary capacity," LetVis v. Shaw, 106 
N.Y.S. 1012; Sumner v. Richie, 6 N.W. 752; and Herman 
v. Lynch, 26 Kan. 435, nor is a pledgee, H ennequin v. Clews, 
111 U.S. 176; Crawford, supra; In re Toklas, 201 Fed. 377 
and In re Ennis, 171 Fed. 755. 
As appellants have argued, there is a minority view to 
the contrary and cases so holding are cited in 42 A.L.R. 2d 
896, supra, beginning at page 902. However, it is signifi-
cant that a number of these cases have been overruled. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently adhered 
to the general rule stated above. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents' indebtedness to appellants was scheduled 
in the bankruptcy proceeding, and respondents were proper-
ly discharged. There are no allegations in appellants' com-
plaint to the effect that respondents were guilty of obtaining 
property by false pretenses or that they caused wilful and 
malicious injury to appellants' property; nor is there any 
allegation in the con1plaint that respondents were guilty of 
fraud or embezzlement. The respondent's relation to ap-
pellants was that of a factor; a fiduciary capacity did not 
exist. 
The District Court's order of a perpetual stay of exe-
cution should not be disturbed. Appellants' appeal should 
be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BALLIF & BALLIF, 
Attorneys for Harold L. Barrick 
WAYNE C. DURHAM, 
Attorney for Fred M. Poulson 
(Paulson) 
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